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iThe use of export restrictions in relation to extractive industries at the multilateral level has gained prominence in the international 
trade debate in the last few years due to their proliferating use on non-fuel minerals and metals and, to a lesser extent, energy 
commodities. Concerns arose in particular at the end of the 2000s, when the number of newly introduced and/or increased 
export restrictions peaked, representing the fastest-growing component of trade restrictions introduced during the economic and 
ﬁnancial crisis according to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The use of export restrictions in the extractive sector has proved 
particularly controversial due to their ambivalence. On the one hand, they could in principle mitigate, under certain conditions, the 
negative environmental externalities linked to extractive activities by slowing the pace of extraction, and, consequently, the rate 
of depletion of ﬁnite resources. On the other hand, they may also serve industrial purposes inasmuch as they de facto subsidize 
domestic downstream producers to the detriment of foreign competitors. Due to this inherent duality, export barriers have 
been ﬁrmly contested by affected countries as beggar-thy-neighbour instruments distorting trade and competition. In contrast, 
resource-rich developing countries have defended the right to use such instruments as legitimate economic and sustainable 
development tools.
Recent trends show that export barriers are to remain critical for extractive industries. Sector-speciﬁc challenges make them 
particularly exposed to the “perverse” effects associated with export restrictions. Yet, current WTO rules on the export side are 
overall fragmented and under-implemented. As a result they do not always prove coherent with the basic principle of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, according to which tariffs are the preferred and acceptable form of protection. 
Against this backdrop, the paper explores some avenues for improving multilateral disciplines on export restrictions in the 
direction of greater transparency, predictability, and ﬂexibility. Although acknowledging that attempts at reform may encounter 
much scepticism, if not open resistance, it is argued that traditional opponents would actually be the ﬁrst to gain from more 
comprehensive and balanced disciplines re-establishing a level playing ﬁeld among all WTO Members. Further, a multilateral 
solution remains essential if one considers that the countries more actively engaging in the use of export restrictions, at least for 
what concerns the extractive sector (for example, China, the Russian Federation), have not yet concluded free trade agreements 
with those players, such as the EU, that systemically pursue a WTO-plus strategy based on the complete removal of export duties 
that systemically pursue a WTO-plus strategy when negotiating provisions on export restrictions in their bilateral and regional 
trade agreements.
The solutions proposed have the potential to be implemented independently from each other. At the same time, they are 
incremental in the sense that they could mutually reinforce and complement each other. In this respect, a reform addressing all 
three “dimensions” of transparency, predictability, and ﬂexibility would have better chances to reach higher levels of commitment 
in each of the dimensions than if it tackled any of them individually. For these reasons, a new agreement, either focused exclusively 
on export barriers or addressing the issue of export restrictions among other regulatory challenges related to extractives on a (more 
or less) broader sectoral basis), remains the ﬁrst-best solution to raise the ambition of any reform of WTO disciplines on the export 
side. Under such an agreement, WTO Members could agree on a centralized regime for administering notiﬁcation and consultation 
requirements, clarify the applicability of the scheduling and binding procedure already envisaged for import tariffs under Article 
II:1(b) GATT to export duty concessions and commit to use it across-the-board to negotiate export tariff bindings in GATT schedules 
on a system-wide basis. They could also envisage ﬂexibilities that go beyond those already available to export restrictions under 
the GATT. An agreement of this kind could represent a workable compromise between net-importing WTO Members and resource-
endowed developing country Members, and dissipate the inconsistencies emanating from the WTO accession regime on export 
duties as revealed in China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths. Finally, by creating the conditions for the launch of multilateral 
negotiations on export duty concessions, and limiting the availability of additional ﬂexibilities to export duty commitments 
included in GATT schedules, it would provide WTO Members with the right incentives to privilege export taxes over more trade-
restrictive quantitative restrictions, in keeping with the spirit of the multilateral trading system.
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1EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON MINERALS AND 
METALS
The most frequently used types of export restrictions 
in the minerals and metals sector include export taxes, 
export bans, and export quotas.6 Export taxes or duties, 
generally deﬁned as “ﬁnancial charge[s] or tax[es] on 
exported products, due because of their exportation” (Van 
den Bossche and Zdouc 2013: 470),7 are the prevalent type 
of measure used to restrict exports of mineral products. 
EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON 
EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES: 
SOME BASIC FEATURES
through the use of export barriers (Fliess et al. 2014: 15–22). In 
many instances, these countries also use export restrictions as 
part of comprehensive industrial policy programmes (see, for 
example, European Commission 2012; Salzman and Wu 2014: 
401).
Against this backdrop, this paper will ﬁrst brieﬂy describe 
recent trends in the use of export restrictions on mineral and 
energy resources (Section 2). Section 3 will give an account 
of the main shortcomings in the WTO legal treatment of 
export restrictions in terms of transparency, predictability, and 
ﬂexibility. Section 4 will discuss possible avenues for designing 
more coherent and balanced disciplines capable of ensuring 
greater transparency and predictability in the interest of secure 
access to supplies, while still preserving policy space for host 
countries to use such measures as legitimate development 
tools under certain conditions. This will be followed by some 
conclusions on the opportunity for renewing engagement 
towards reforming WTO rules on export restrictions.5
This paper considers concrete policy options to better 
regulate the use of export restrictions in relation to extractive 
industries at the multilateral level. The topic has gained 
prominence in the international trade debate in the last few 
years due to the proliferating use of export restrictions on 
non-fuel minerals and metals and, to a lesser extent, energy 
commodities. Concerns arose in particular at the end of 
the 2000s, when the number of newly introduced and/or 
increased export restrictions peaked, representing the fastest-
growing component of trade restrictions introduced during 
the economic and ﬁnancial crisis.1 Still in 2013–2014, export 
restrictions accounted for 27 percent of the total number 
of trade-restrictive measures introduced by World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Members, the highest percentage ever 
registered since the beginning of the crisis.2 The latest “Report 
on Potentially Trade-Restrictive Measures” prepared by the 
Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission 
in November 2014 warns against the resurgence of exports 
restrictions, emphasizing that it is “particularly alarming as 
all countries are globally dependent on each other’s natural 
resources” (European Commission 2014: 13).
The use of export restrictions in the extractive sector has 
proved particularly controversial due to their ambivalence. 
On the one hand, they could in principle mitigate, under 
certain conditions, the negative environmental externalities 
linked to extractive activities by slowing the pace of extraction 
and exploitation, and, consequently, the rate of depletion 
of ﬁnite resources (Korinek and Kim 2010: 119; Fung and 
Korinek 2014: 19–20). On the other hand, they may also 
serve industrial purposes inasmuch as they de facto subsidize 
domestic downstream producers to the detriment of foreign 
competitors (Fung and Korinek 2014: 34). 
Due to this inherent duality, export barriers have been ﬁrmly 
contested by affected countries as beggar-thy-neighbour 
instruments distorting trade and competition.3 In contrast, 
developing countries, be it resource-rich emerging economies 
or commodity-dependent developing countries (CDDCs), 
have defended the right to use such instruments as legitimate 
economic and sustainable development tools. According 
to this line of argument, export restrictions are not about 
achieving industrial promotion as a goal in and of itself. Rather, 
they are a means to move towards and/or consolidate a model 
of economic growth and sustainable development based on 
export diversiﬁcation and industrial base growth, in accordance 
with the principle of sovereignty over natural resources.4 The 
fact, however, remains that due to the high concentration 
of extractive resources, a relatively limited number of large 
suppliers detain substantial export market shares and are thus 
in a position to exert pressure on world prices and world supply 
INTRODUCTION
See GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG2/W/40, 8 Aug. 1989; Radetzski (2010: 207–
10); WTO Doc. WT/MIN(11)/ST/19, 16 Dec. 2011, cited in WTO Doc. WT/
TPR/S/277, 13 Feb. 2013, p. 96; WTO Doc. WT/TPR/M/249/Add.2, 28 Oct. 
2011, p. 45; Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 7.364–615. 
See GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG2/W/40, 8 Aug. 1989; WTO Doc. TN/
MA/W/11/Add. 6  , 27 Apr. 2006; WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/101 , 17 Jan. 2008.
WTO Doc. WT/TPR/OV/W/8, 27 June 2014, p. 23. 
WTO Doc. WT/TPR/OV/14, 21 Nov. 2011, p. 17. 
Overall, this paper draws from Espa.
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2Between 2010 and 2011, Zimbabwe substituted the export ban with an 
export tax (OECD Inventory).  
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According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), 144 measures at the HS 6-digit 
level of product classiﬁcation were applied on primary and/
or semi-processed forms of minerals and metals and another 
141 on metal waste and scrap (cumulatively affecting 55 
groups of minerals and metals) by a total of 23 countries 
in the years 2009–2012 (Fliess et al. 2014: 11–12). The 
bulk of these measures were adopted after 2009, with 
the types of products subject to restrictions substantially 
remaining unchanged since then (Fliess et al. 2014: 7). The 
average export tax in 2012 was approximately 11 percent 
for both primary minerals and metals and waste and scrap 
products, although the highest tax rate signiﬁcantly differed 
(respectively 30 percent and 50 percent) (Fliess et al. 2014: 
29). 
The majority of the measures in place are applied by a 
limited number of countries, including China, the Russian 
Federation, Argentina, India, and Vietnam. Often, these 
countries individually control a signiﬁcant (if not dominant) 
share of world exports (OECD Inventory). Other large 
suppliers applying export duties on more than one group 
of minerals and metals include the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Finally, a number 
of least developed countries (LDCs) and small developing 
countries also apply export taxes either on selected minerals 
products or on different waste and scrap metals (for example, 
Gabon, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, 
Afghanistan) (OECD Inventory). 
Export quantitative restrictions or QRs (that is, restrictions 
that operate by limiting the volume of exports) have 
been used somewhat more moderately. Use of absolute 
bans has been conﬁned to a few countries prohibiting 
exports of speciﬁc types of minerals and metals. Examples 
include Zimbabwe, the Philippines, and Venezuela, which 
respectively ban exports of chromium ores and concentrates 
(since 2007), platinum group metals ores and concentrates 
(since the 1970s), and ash and residues containing antimony, 
beryllium, chromium, copper, and precious metals (since 
2005).8 In contrast, Indonesia has prohibited exports of 
unprocessed minerals altogether (with the exception of coal) 
since 12 January 2014 (European Commission 2014: 101; 
Ramdoo 2015). Export prohibitions are however on the rise 
in the waste and scrap metal sector. According to the OECD, 
“export prohibitions account for a much higher share of total 
export restrictions in this industry (8% in 2009 and 23% in 
2012) than in the primary minerals and metals industry (5% 
in 2009 and 14% in 2012)” (Fliess et al. 2014: 19). Among the 
countries resorting to such measures are Azerbaijan, Burundi, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Venezuela (OECD Inventory). 
Export quotas (that is, numerical ceilings used to limit the 
maximum volume of exports of a certain product) (Fliess et 
al. 2014: 40) have reportedly been used by China, Ukraine, 
and Belarus since 2008 (OECD Inventory). Belarus has 
employed export quotas on various forms of ferrous and 
non-ferrous (copper, nickel and aluminium) waste and scrap 
(OECD Inventory), while Ukraine has imposed such measures 
on copper ash and residues, as well as on gold and silver 
waste and scrap forms (OECD Inventory). China accounts 
for the wide majority of export quotas currently in place on 
minerals and metals. In 2009–2012, exports of 44 groups of 
minerals were capped in China based on the OECD Inventory 
(Fliess et al. 2014: 13), corresponding to 193 tariff lines at HS 
8-digit level, according to China’s 2013 Trade Policy Review.9 
Finally, WTO Members have predominantly tightened 
existing export restrictions in the last few years (for example, 
through export duty increases or, in the case of export 
quotas, cap reductions) (OECD Inventory). Sporadically, 
however, export restrictions were phased out or relaxed. 
China removed a number of export duties and quotas in 
accordance with the Appellate Body’s rulings in the China 
– Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths disputes. Yet, in 
some cases it concurrently reinforced other types of export 
restrictions (for example, it announced tighter export 
licensing rules on rare earths after eliminating the export 
quotas). Other newly acceded WTO Members, including the 
Russian Federation, Vietnam, and Ukraine, have reduced and/
or removed export duties on selected mineral products as 
agreed upon under their accession protocols. 
EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ENERGY 
COMMODITIES
As with the minerals and metals sector, export taxes are 
the most commonly reported type of export restrictions 
applied on energy commodities. Countries generally use 
such measures in the attempt to reap the beneﬁts of high 
energy prices and/or achieve price insulation goals for 
domestic consumers at times of price increases. Accordingly, 
several large energy exporters have raised export taxes 
on petroleum, natural gas, and/or related products in the 
last few years. The Russian government has, for instance, 
repeatedly increased the export duty rates applied on energy 
As measures levied at the customs level, they are also labelled export 
“tariffs” analogously to those applied on the import side.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), non-automatic export licensing schemes are the 
most commonly used type of export restriction (Fliess et al.2014: 9). Non-
automatic licensing schemes can be employed to administer export quotas 
or as an instrument in and of itself. Depending on how they operate, they 
may have a negative impact on export volumes (for example, when they 
result in excessively long processing times and/or impose discretionary 
requirements). Detailed information on the concrete functioning of these 
measures is, however, often hard to obtain (Fliess et al.2014: 33). As for 
WTO case law, non-automatic licensing schemes constitute a “restriction” 
within the meaning of Article XI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) only insofar as they have a limiting effect on trade, that is, 
they must affect export volumes. See Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, 
paras. 7.915–8. 
7
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WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/300/Rev.1, p. 81. 9
3For a full account, see Espa and Holzer 2015.
The Congress has 60 days to veto the presidential authorization. Under 
the US Export Administration Act, the president may also restrict exports 
of reﬁned petroleum products. However, this authority was not exercised 
since 1981 (Espa and Holzer 2015). 
Exports to free trade agreement (FTA) partners are presumed to be in the 
public interest. However, there is no ofﬁcial list of eligibility requirements 
which should guide the process of approving applications involving exports 
to non-FTA trading partners (US Congressional Research Service 2013: 14-
15).
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The proliferation of export restrictions on extractive 
resources creates a pressing need to enhance transparency 
and predictability in the regulation of export restrictions, 
not only at the level of regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
but also multilaterally. While the improvement of existing 
WTO disciplines on the export side may by some be 
considered sceptically as an option, it is important to note 
that, as they currently stand, WTO rules have created 
huge discontent due to wide disparities in the rights and 
obligations of different Members. The lack of ﬂexibility in the 
commitments assumed individually by a number of newly 
acceded developing country Members has in particular come 
under the spotlight in the aftermath of the China – Raw 
Materials and China – Rare Earths Appellate Body rulings. 
The clariﬁcation and evolution of existing WTO disciplines 
may represent an opportunity for those developing country 
PROBLEM/OPPORTUNITY
products since the early 2000s (European Commission 2014: 
103). Purportedly, such adjustments coincided with upward 
adjustments of world energy prices, although in some 
instances affected partners denounced them as prohibitive 
(European Commission 2014: 103). Since its accession to 
the WTO in 2011, the Russian Federation agreed to bind 
the export duty rates applied on oil and gas products on 
the basis of speciﬁc formulas incorporated into its Schedule 
of Concessions annexed to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).10 Other net-exporters that have 
introduced and/or tightened export duties applied on energy 
commodities lately are Kazakhstan (European Commission 
2014: 102)11 and Argentina.12 Other WTO Members such 
as Nigeria13, Mexico14 and Malaysia15 also tax exports of 
petroleum products, albeit not prohibitively.  
Export quantitative restrictions are employed in the 
energy sector by relatively well-endowed net-importing 
countries to relieve import dependence and/or avoid supply 
shortages. Among them are large world energy producers 
and consumers such as the United States (US) and China. 
In China, exports of coal, crude oil, and processed oil are 
subject to state trading,16 and to quotas administered 
through non-automatic export licensing.17 According to the 
Chinese government, these restrictions purport to ensure 
adequate domestic supply and exhaustible natural resources 
conservation.18 As the world’s largest energy consumer 
and importer, China seems unlikely to phase out these 
restrictions in the near future.19
The US severely restricts exports of crude oil and natural 
gas. Crude oil exports are prohibited unless they fall under 
the scope of speciﬁc statutory control regimes provided 
in the Export Administration Regulations on Short Supply 
Controls of the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).20 
In the afﬁrmative, they may be authorized, provided 
that the US president speciﬁcally ascertains, in a report 
submitted to the Congress, that they will not diminish 
the total quantity or quality of petroleum available to the 
US and are in the national interest.21 Natural gas exports 
are also strictly monitored through a non-automatic 
licensing scheme administered by the US Department of 
Energy (DoE). So far, the DoE has delayed the granting of 
the licenses and conditioned issuing them to a somewhat 
discretionary national interest test.22 The US export regime 
was established in the 1970s in an attempt to avoid excessive 
dependence on Arab oil. Since then, however, the US shale 
revolution has gradually transformed the US, traditionally a 
top world energy importer, into the largest global producer 
of oil and natural gas (Sieminski 2014). Prospects of self-
sufﬁciency have opened new scenarios for the US, which 
could possibly entail the removal of US export barriers on 
energy products. Consensus on the matter is, however, far 
from being reached (Espa and Holzer 2015). On a more 
general level, it also remains to be seen whether the recent 
trend of falling energy prices will affect the landscape of 
export restrictions on energy commodities (Plumer 2015). 
Kazakhstan also banned exports of various gas products from May 2010 to 
July 2012.
WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/277, Trade Policy Review of Argentina, 13 Feb. 2013, 
p. 96, 145.
WTO Doc. WT/TRP/S/247, Trade Policy Review of Nigeria, 24 May 2011, p. 
33. 
WTO Doc. WT/TRP/S/279, Trade Policy Review of Mexico, 27 Feb. 2013, p. 
84.
Chelliah  (2011); WTO Doc. WT/TRP/S/292, Trade Policy Review of 
Malaysia, 27 Jan. 2014, pp. 58-59. 
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WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/300, Trade Policy Review of China, 27 May 2014, p. 
104. 
Trade Policy Review of China, 27 May 2014, p.103. 
The responsible institution is the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.  Trade 
Policy Review of China, 27 May 2014, pp.  81–82. 
Since 2010, China has been the top world energy consumer, accounting 
for 17.5 percent of global energy consumption (US Energy Information 
Administration 2014). 
16
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See footnote # and footnote ## in Part V of the Russian Federation’s 
Schedule, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(11)/2/Add.1, 17 Nov. 2011.
10
4The ﬁrst report was released in January 2009 and the most recent one on 
June 2015 (WTO 2015). 
The last report was issued in Nov. 2014 (see WTO Doc. WT/TPR/OV/17, 
24 Nov. 2014). The WTO Secretariat has also created a database covering 
information on the trade-restrictive measures contained in the Trade 
Monitoring Reports (“Trade Monitoring Database,” http://tmdb.wto.org). 
The ﬁrst report was distributed in Nov. 2008 and the last report was 
released in Nov. 2014 (European Commission 2014). 
The OECD Inventory also covers wood products (Fliess et al.2014: 22). 
According to the OECD, the Inventory “covers 80% of world production 
volume of minerals, metals and wood in their primary state and a large 
share of related global trade (67% of 2012 total value of exports of 
primary raw materials, 45% of total exports of primary and semi-processed 
materials combined, and over 90% of exports of metals waste and scrap)” 
(Fliess et al.2014: 22). Along the same lines, the OECD has also created an 
inventory for agricultural commodities ( Liapis 2013).
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Members traditionally resistant to change but currently 
penalized by the effects of their individual obligations (for 
example, China), as long as reform attempts provide secure 
policy space to address their economic and sustainable 
development concerns.   
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
Monitoring of export restrictions has increased in the last 
few years. Since the outbreak of the ﬁnancial and economic 
crisis, in particular, a number of surveillance mechanisms 
were put in place, which cover export restrictions as well. 
These include the G20-mandated joint reports on trade 
and investment measures, released twice a year by the 
Secretariats of the WTO, the OECD and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),23 the 
reports on potentially trade-restrictive measures of the 
Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission,24 
and the periodic trade monitoring reports issued by the WTO 
Director General to the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB).25 
Recently, the OECD has compiled the ﬁrst factual inventory 
of export restrictions, covering more than 80 industrial 
raw materials in their primary, semi-reﬁned and waste and 
scrap forms at the HS6 level of product classiﬁcation by 84 
countries (including the ﬁve leading producers of each of 
materials considered) for the period 2009–2012.26 Although 
such initiatives have contributed to mapping patterns of use 
of export restrictions, lack of transparency still stands as 
a major issue, particularly in the extractive sector—where 
uncertainty may be particularly detrimental due to the time 
disconnect between investment decisions and extraction 
itself (Fung and Korinek 2014: 27; Agatiello and Fliess 2013: 
32; Fliess et al. 2014: 33). The OECD has in particular warned 
against the unavailability of systemic and comparable data 
due to the “relative paucity of information published on 
governmental websites and the fact that not all measures are 
notiﬁed in the WTO” (Fliess et al. 2014: 31).
Under the current WTO regime, there are no notiﬁcation 
requirements speciﬁc to export restrictions. WTO Members 
introducing and/or modifying “export duties” and other 
types of “export restrictions” are bound by the general 
notiﬁcation requirements established under the 1993 
Uruguay Round Ministerial Decision on Notiﬁcation 
Procedures inasmuch as such measures are listed in the List 
of Notiﬁable Measures annexed to the Decision. Yet, such 
requirements are formulated quite loosely, as WTO Members 
are obliged to notify, to the maximum extent possible, trade 
measures affecting the operation of GATT 1994 “guided, as 
appropriate, by the annexed list of measures.” Accordingly, 
no compliance mechanism is envisaged, and WTO Members 
are simply reminded of their regular notiﬁcation obligations 
each year by the WTO Secretariat and, eventually, solicited in 
the event of non-fulﬁlment. 
A fairly stricter regime applies to quantitative export 
restrictions, which fall within the scope of the Decision 
on Notiﬁcation Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions 
adopted by the Council for Trade in Goods on 1 December 
1995.27 The Decision was recently revised because of its 
modest level of implementation (Agatiello and Fliess 2013: 
13–14). As of 2012, WTO Members are required to make 
complete notiﬁcations of all quantitative restrictions in 
force every two years, and to notify any variations as soon 
as possible, and in any case no later than six months from 
their entry into force. All information provided by Members 
is then merged into a public database compiled by the WTO 
Secretariat, which also circulates a report based on such 
information every year.28 
LACK OF PREDICTABILITY
Under current WTO rules, Members enjoy different margins 
of manoeuvre depending on whether they apply export 
duties or quantitative export restrictions, and on whether 
they are exclusively bound by GATT obligations or have 
abided by speciﬁc obligations that exceed those arising 
under the GATT. Such “WTO-plus” commitments have been 
assumed by a number of newly acceded WTO Members in 
their post-1994 accession protocols. 
As to GATT general disciplines, Article XI:1 distinguishes 
export duties or taxes from quantitative export restrictions. 
The latter are outlawed in the same way as import 
quantitative restrictions, whereas export duties or taxes fall 
outside the scope of the elimination obligation. In contrast 
to the legal treatment of import tariffs, however, the GATT 
does not explicitly envisage a mechanism for scheduling and 
binding export duties à la Article II:1 (b), although Article 
XXVIII (bis) encourages WTO Members to negotiate import 
and export duty commitments alike. WTO Members thus 
remain free to schedule and bind export duties in their GATT 
schedules following the same procedure used for import tariff 
WTO Doc. G/L/59, 10 Jan. 1996. 
WTO Doc. G/L/59/Rev.1, 22 June 2012.
27
28
5LACK OF FLEXIBILITY
WTO Members seeking justiﬁcation for export restrictions 
used in derogation from their commitments under legitimate 
circumstances are not always in the position to invoke 
existing GATT ﬂexibilities. The most notable example 
concerns newly acceded WTO Members that assumed WTO-
plus obligations on export duties in individual provisions 
of their accession protocols. As explained above, these 
Members cannot adjust such commitments as allowed 
by the deconsolidation procedure envisaged under Article 
XXVIII GATT. Moreover, these commitments are not 
necessarily subject to GATT general exceptions such as 
those recognized under Article XX. Based on the AB ruling 
in China – Rare Earths, export duties imposed in breach of 
an accession protocol provision may be justiﬁed by invoking 
GATT general exceptions only insofar as such a provision 
has an objective link to the GATT 1994 or to the exception 
sought (to be established on a case-by-case basis). In other 
words, the availability of GATT general exceptions depends 
on the speciﬁc language of the individual accession protocol 
provisions, interpreted in their relevant context and in light 
of the overall architecture of the WTO Agreement and the 
speciﬁc circumstances of each case. 
Such conditionality in the applicability of GATT general 
exceptions may create the absurd incentive to substitute 
export duties with more trade-distortive, but GATT-
inconsistent, quantitative types of export restrictions in 
WTO Members bound by WTO-plus obligations whose 
language excludes the availability of Article XX (for example, 
China) (in this sense, see also Baroncini 2011). Moreover, it 
widens the differences among WTO Members in terms of 
their rights and obligations with regard to the use of export 
duties, creating what Qin calls a “multi-tiered” membership 
(Qin 2012: 1161-62). Not surprisingly, the fragmentation of 
WTO disciplines on export duties has deepened the divide 
between import-dependent WTO Members and resource-
endowed developing country Members. The latter have in 
particular contested the substantial inequalities created 
by the WTO accession regime on export duties, allegedly in 
contrast with “constitutional” WTO principles such as the 
principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity but also with 
general international law principles such as the principle of 
sovereignty over natural resources. 
More generally, GATT-inconsistent export restrictions, 
be it Article XI-inconsistent QRs, export duties in excess 
of those set forth in GATT schedules, or export duties in 
violations of WTO-plus obligations contained in accession 
The matter is far from settled as explained by Qin (2012: 1158). 30
concessions. Once included in GATT schedules, export duty 
concessions would thus be binding and legally enforceable by 
virtue of Article II:1(a)  and Article II:7 (Ehring and Chianale 
2012: 112–117), and could be subject to the deconsolidation 
procedure under Article XXVIII (see, for example, Matsushita 
2011: 273; Qin 2012: 1160–61). 
However, WTO Members bound exclusively by GATT 
obligations have generally lacked the incentive to schedule 
and bind export duties. So far, only Australia has negotiated 
export duty concessions in its GATT schedule by inserting an 
ad-hoc note referring to 11 HS 8-digit tariff lines—accounting 
for a predominant share of its exports of mineral products 
(that is, iron ore, titanium ore, zirconium ore, coal, peat, 
coke, reﬁned copper, unwrought nickel, nickel oxide, and lead 
waste and scrap)—in Section 2 of Part I of its Schedule on 
“MFN [most-favoured nation] import tariff commitments on 
non-agricultural products.” The note states: “There shall be 
no export duty on this product.”29  
In the context of its WTO accession, the Russian Federation 
has also negotiated export duty concessions following 
the scheduling and binding procedure already envisaged 
in the GATT. In particular, it created a new Part in its GATT 
Schedule—Part V “Export Duties”—where it included export 
duty concessions on more than 700 tariff lines. In this 
respect, the Russian case represents the ﬁrst example of 
systematic incorporation of export duty commitments in 
the form of concessions into a Member’s GATT schedule as 
admitted by GATT provisions. Yet, it has so far remained an 
isolated case, even among the newly acceded WTO Members 
that did assume speciﬁc WTO-plus obligations on the use of 
export duties in their accession protocols. 
Nine other WTO Members (Mongolia, Latvia, Croatia, 
China, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Ukraine, Montenegro, and 
Tajikistan) have assumed country-speciﬁc obligations on 
the use of export duties in the context of their accession 
to the WTO. These WTO-plus commitments are quite 
uneven in scope and coverage, with some countries abiding 
by general elimination obligations (for example, China) 
and others committing to phase down and bind the export 
duties applied on a speciﬁc list of products (for example, 
Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Ukraine). In all cases, however, these 
obligations were not incorporated into the respective GATT 
schedules but rather assumed under individual accession 
protocol provisions. Accordingly, they cannot be adjusted 
in accordance with GATT-speciﬁc procedures in principle 
applicable to exports duty concessions included in GATT 
schedules (for example, Article XXVIII). The extent to which 
they can be modiﬁed and/or withdrawn depends on whether 
accession protocol provisions can be amended.30
Overall, the wide majority of WTO Members remains under 
no obligation as to the use of export duties. The paucity of 
commitments in the area of export duties makes it a key area 
to address in view of achieving greater predictability in the 
regulation of export restrictions.
Australia’s Uruguay Schedule, AUS1-201 through AUS1-204. Such 
commitments were undertaken in exchange for certain import 
commitments of the European Communities, and then extended to all 
WTO Members under the MFN clause (Ehring and Chianale 2012: 114). 
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6protocol provisions, are not subject to the whole range of 
exceptions available to GATT-inconsistent restrictions on 
the import side. Examples of import-speciﬁc exceptions 
include a number of economic development and emergency 
exceptions—(i) Article XVIII (c) GATT, which allows low-
income developing country Members to deviate from 
import concessions in order to protect infant industries; 
(ii) Article XII and XVIII (b) GATT, which address temporary 
balance of payments disequilibria; and (iii) Article XIX GATT, 
which permits WTO Members to withdraw or modify tariff 
concessions if, as a result of unforeseen developments, a 
sudden, sharp and substantial surge of imports signiﬁcantly 
impairs the position of a domestic industry. 
The rigidity of GATT disciplines on the export side may be 
explained by the relative marginality of export restrictions 
at the time of the genesis of the GATT. Yet, inasmuch as the 
proliferation of export barriers creates a pressing need for 
stronger WTO rules, it may restrain WTO Members from 
accepting to raise their levels of commitment, particularly in 
the area of export duties where lack of engagement is already 
an issue. This all the more holds true for newly acceded WTO 
Members whose policy space is limited by the undertaking of 
inﬂexible WTO-plus obligations. 
Flexibility therefore appears an essential element of any 
proposals aimed at initiating a discussion on how to reform 
current WTO rules on the export side. Any reassessment of 
existing WTO disciplines would have no chance to overcome 
the resistance of Members unless they can be reassured 
they would not irrevocably lose policy space to use export 
restrictions to pursue their own economic and sustainable 
development needs (see Liu and Maughan 2012). 
This section discusses possible avenues for enhancing 
transparency, predictability and ﬂexibility of WTO disciplines 
on export restrictions. The options proposed are not 
mutually exclusive but incremental. They go in the direction 
of greater regulatory coherence while having in mind the 
need to restore a climate of trust among WTO Members as 
the necessary precondition for raising the level of ambition of 
any attempt at reform. Because of the limits of current WTO 
rules on export duties, and the inconsistencies emanating 
from the fragmentation of such disciplines, the options 
discussed address the area of export duties in particular. 
 
TRANSPARENCY
Action on transparency remains crucial in the area of export 
restrictions in general (Bellmann and Wilke 2012: 200–201), 
and all the more so in the case of export restrictions applied 
in the extractive sector, where decision and implementation 
lags make industries more exposed to uncertainty risks 
(Fung and Korinek 2014: 19). Although recent initiatives 
have made considerable progress in monitoring export 
restrictions, the lack of transparency remains, in the words 
of the OECD, “disconcerting” (Fliess et al. 2014: 33), and 
has been attributed by it to the weakness of the notiﬁcation 
requirements applicable to export restrictions in the WTO 
(Fliess et al. 2014: 31).
A possible way to remedy lack of information could be to 
put in place a centralized regime for the notiﬁcation of all 
types of export restrictions at the WTO, to be administered 
by an ad hoc committee. Such a regime could build on the 
model established by the 2012 revision of the Decision on 
Notiﬁcation Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions, and 
introduce stricter time limits and content requirements 
for WTO Members. For instance, WTO Members could 
be required to make complete notiﬁcations of all export 
restrictions (duties and QRs) in force every year, and to 
notify any new measures, or any variations thereof, within 
a reasonable period of time (for example, 60 days) before 
the effective date of entry into force.31 Counter-notiﬁcation 
could also be allowed.32 The committee would regularly 
review the notiﬁcations and counter-notiﬁcations and make 
recommendations on the adequacy of the notiﬁcations and 
the need for further information, including on the effect of 
the notiﬁed measures on trade.33 All information provided 
by Members would then be made available to the public. 
A report could also be circulated every year based on such 
information. The notiﬁcation regime could be strengthened 
through the introduction of consultation requirements, 
also to be administered by the committee. An interesting 
model in this respect could be the Committee on Balance of 
Payments Restrictions.
The centralization of information regarding export 
restrictions, matched with standardized consultation 
procedures, would have the potential to ensure better and 
wider monitoring of export restrictions compared to the 
plethora of voluntary initiatives covering export restrictions. 
The implementation of such a regime could nevertheless 
beneﬁt from close cooperation with institutions active 
RESPONSES
The limit of 60 days was, for instance, envisaged in the European Union 
(EU) proposal for a WTO Agreement on Export Taxes tabled in the context 
of the Doha Negotiating Group on Non-agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA). See WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/11/Add.6, 27 Apr. 2006, Article 7. 
See WTO Doc. G/L/59/Rev.1, 22 June 2012, para. 5. 
See Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of 
GATT 1994, para. 2.
31
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7Qin argues that the inclusion of Part V into GATT schedules, incorporating 
existing WTO-plus commitments, would not require an amendment 
of the individual accession protocol provisions but just an amendment 
of the schedules. Accordingly, such commitments would constitute 
“new” concessions to be accommodated in accordance with internal 
GATT procedures used to record unilateral, bilateral and multilateral 
trade-liberalizing concessions. See Qin (2012: 1183), citing the Decision 
on Procedures for Modiﬁcation and Rectiﬁcation of Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions, 26 March 1980, GATT Doc. L/4962, BISD 27S/25. 
See WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/101, 17 Jan. 2008, para. 9. 
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schedules of the newly acceded WTO Members.36 As such, 
the integration of WTO-plus obligations into GATT schedules 
would not increase their scope and coverage, although 
the Members concerned may also negotiate additional 
obligations (for example, increase the number of tariff lines 
scheduled and bound). Elimination commitments would 
correspond to zero bindings. Speciﬁc ﬂexibilities could also be 
envisaged for LDCs and/or small and vulnerable economies. 
These countries could, for instance, schedule export taxes 
but maintain these export taxes unbound for all or only 
certain tariff lines depending on speciﬁc developing needs 
as suggested by the EU in its Revised Submission on Export 
Taxes.37 A threshold could alternatively be set for according 
special and differential treatment (SDT), such as whether the 
country in question is a signiﬁcant exporter (for example, 
accounting for more than 5 percent of world exports) of a 
speciﬁc product. 
The negotiation of export duty concessions would be in 
keeping with GATT provisions, which admit the possibility 
for WTO Members to negotiate export duty concessions 
in their GATT schedules. Accordingly, negotiations could 
be envisaged in a post-2015 agenda without the need 
for formally amending the GATT or for concluding a new 
agreement, although an interpretative understanding could 
perhaps be useful to deﬁnitively clarify the applicability 
of the scheduling and binding procedure à la Article II:1(b) 
GATT to export duty concessions in light of Article II:1(a) and 
Article XXVIII (bis), including the deconsolidation procedure 
under Article XXVIII. 
WTO Members could agree on speciﬁc modalities governing 
the negotiation of export duty concessions. Considering that 
a relatively limited number of WTO Members is currently 
responsible for a large share of the export taxes in place having 
beggar-thy-neighbour effects, at least in the extractive sector, 
modalities based on linear or tiered cuts would not necessarily 
provide such Members with the necessary incentive to engage 
in negotiations, whereas the “request-offer” modalities appear 
in principle more appropriate. Another viable solution would 
be to opt for the “sectoral approach,” with product coverage 
limited to a speciﬁc list of raw materials, either solely of 
extractive origin or not. In theory, the larger the product 
in the area, such as the OECD, and be facilitated through 
passage of information. Importantly, strengthened rules 
on transparency of export restrictions could be part of a 
more comprehensive agreement covering other regulatory 
aspects, but also achieved independently by means of a 
decision adopted by the Ministerial Conference, which has 
the authority to take decisions “on all matters under any 
of the Multilateral Trade Agreements” in accordance with 
Article IV:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement. Pursuant to Article 
IV:7 of the Marrakesh Agreement, additional committees 
may also be established by the Ministerial Conference “with 
such function as it may deem appropriate.” The General 
Council could also adopt such a decision in the intervals 
between the biennial meetings of the Ministerial Conference 
in accordance with Article IV:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
A deal on transparency, although limited in scope, may, 
however, be conducive to foster action on the predictability 
side (Bellmann and Wilke 2012: 201).
PREDICTABILITY
Paucity of commitments in the area of export duties remains 
one of the main weaknesses in the WTO regulation of 
export restrictions. At the same time, WTO-plus obligations 
on export duties assumed by selected developing country 
Members in their post-1994 accession protocols, although 
in principle constituting a remedy to the general lack 
of predictability, have created substantial disparities 
among WTO Members, with the ensuing inconsistencies 
engendering growing mistrust in the system. 
As a way to raise the level of commitment in this area while 
keeping in mind the need to identify an overarching principle 
governing the use of export taxes on a system-wide level, 
the European Union (EU) advanced a textual proposal in the 
Doha Negotiating Group on Non-agricultural Market Access 
(NGMA) centred on the principle of complete elimination of 
export duties.34 The introduction of such a principle reﬂected 
the approach that the EU itself has successfully promoted, 
along with a number of other net-importing economies, 
in bilateral and regional trade agreements (see Fung and 
Korinek 2014). Yet, the opposition raised by the proposal 
made clear that WTO Members are not prone to accept a 
general prohibition obligation at the multilateral level. 
A viable alternative may consist in launching multilateral 
negotiations of export duty concessions on a product-by-
product basis following the scheduling and binding procedure 
already envisaged under Article II:1 (b) GATT for import tariff. 
Such a “negotiated solution” was generally advocated by the 
EU in its Revised Submission on Export Taxes although not 
sufﬁciently elaborated.35 WTO Members could incorporate 
export tariff bindings in a new Part V devoted to “Export 
Duties” in accordance with the Russian model. Based on 
the same principle, export duty commitments already 
assumed under accession protocol provisions would also 
on the occasion be incorporated into Part V of the GATT 
See WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/11/Add.6 27 Apr. 2006, Article 1. Speciﬁc 
ﬂexibilities were, however, envisaged for developing country Members and 
especially LDCs (see Articles 2 and 3). 
See WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/101, 17 Jan. 2008 paras. 8-9.
34
35
8Should consensus on the reduction of export taxes through a negotiated 
solution fail multilaterally, a subset of WTO Members representing 
a “critical mass” could in principle still commit to schedule and bind 
export taxes along the lines just described on an agreed list of products, 
similarly to what happened in the case of the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA). In such a case, a group of WTO Members would need 
to sign a Ministerial Declaration, whose provisions would come into effect 
upon acceptance by a number of Members collectively accounting for a 
sufﬁciently large percentage of world trade in raw materials as agreed on in 
the Declaration itself. The export tariff concessions would then be applied 
on a non-discriminatory basis (MFN).
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Although potentially detrimental for affected partners, the renegotiation of 
export duty concessions would not alter the overall balance of concessions. 
According to Article XXVIII GATT, a WTO Member can modify or withdraw 
its concessions provided it guarantees compensatory adjustments. In 
the absence of compensatory adjustments, affected Members maintain 
the right to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions in order 
to “maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
concessions not less favourable to trade than before.” As to GATT general 
exceptions, the conditions set forth under Article XX are such as to ensure 
that WTO Members cannot legitimately derogate from their commitments 
unless legitimate circumstances require it and for the time strictly 
necessary, and only if alternative options are not reasonably available.  
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Conﬁrming the availability of such exceptions would not 
frustrate predictability inasmuch as Article XII and Article 
XVIII GATT lay down speciﬁc conditions, rules, and procedures 
aimed at ensuring that import tariffs increases (or Article XI:1-
inconsistent import restrictions) occur only after the WTO 
Member concerned has entered into negotiations or notiﬁed 
and consulted with affected WTO Members. Moreover, 
inasmuch as the extension of economic development 
exceptions would be conditioned to the negotiation of export 
duty concessions, the use of export tariffs over more trade-
distortive QRs is in keeping with the spirit of the multilateral 
trading system. 
In the same spirit, the introduction of an economic emergency 
exception could also work as a conﬁdence-building mechanism. 
A safeguard clause applicable on the export side could ensure 
WTO Members maintain policy space in the event excessive 
surges of exports or price spikes caused by external upward 
shifts in world demand disrupt domestic supply and/or cause 
price volatility in domestic markets. Such a safety valve could, 
for instance, be based on price and quantity triggers similarly 
to what happens for the special agricultural safeguards (SSGs) 
envisaged under Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA).41 In other words, WTO Members scheduling and binding 
export duties could reserve the right to automatically increase 
them above negotiated levels when exports grow or domestic 
prices increase above a certain level.42 Accordingly, WTO 
Members would once more be incentivized to engage in the 
negotiation of export duty concessions. The use of SSGs-like 
safeguards on the export side would, ﬁnally, need to comply 
coverage, the greater the beneﬁt WTO Members would get 
from negotiating export tariff bindings multilaterally, although 
it might be difﬁcult to reach agreement on which raw 
materials to include.38  
Independent of its concrete modalities, a negotiating 
solution would ensure greater levels of predictability while at 
the same time re-establishing a “level playing ﬁeld” among 
WTO Members. By bringing all export duty commitments 
assumed by WTO Members into the GATT framework as 
per Article II:7, such a solution would in fact harmonize the 
procedure used to assume obligations in the area of export 
duties by all WTO Members and thus make available, 
automatically, relevant and applicable GATT adjustment 
procedures and exceptions across the board. WTO Members 
would thus be more inclined to accept lower levels of 
export tariff bindings as long as they are left with the right 
to renegotiate or derogate from scheduled commitments in 
accordance with the conditions set out under Article XXVIII 
and GATT general exceptions.39 Accordingly, scheduling 
and binding export duties multilaterally could represent 
a workable compromise for various categories of WTO 
Members, from import-dependent countries advocating a 
stronger approach towards beggar-thy-neighbour export 
duties and newly acceded WTO Members currently 
constrained in their ability to resort to export taxes, to 
many developing countries whose aspiration to economic 
diversiﬁcation may be hampered by abuses of such 
instruments by other countries.
FLEXIBILITY
The negotiation of export duty concessions at the multilateral 
level through a mechanism à la Article II:1(b) GATT would 
increase predictability in the area without compromising 
ﬂexibility. WTO Members would be left with policy space 
to renegotiate their concessions in accordance with the 
deconsolidation procedure established under Article 
XXVIII GATT and/or use export taxes under the legitimate 
circumstances recognized under GATT general exceptions. Yet, 
a negotiating solution would not permit to extend ﬂexibilities 
beyond those already envisaged under the GATT for imports and 
exports alike.  
Support for such a solution in the area of export duties could 
increase, and the level of ambition of the negotiations be 
raised, if additional ﬂexibilities were envisaged with the aim to 
reassure WTO Members that export duties could be used as 
development tools under speciﬁc circumstances. For instance, 
relevant import-speciﬁc exceptions available under the GATT 
could be extended to export duty concessions. In this respect, 
it is noteworthy that the EU proposal for a WTO Agreement on 
Export Taxes included an Article stating: “WTO Members, and 
in particular developing countries, may resort to export taxes by 
reference to Article XVIII GATT on governmental assistance to 
economic development and Article XII GATT on safeguarding 
the balance of payment.” 40 
WTO Doc., TN/MA/W/11/Add. 6, 27 Apr. 2006, Article 5. The extension 
of such exceptions was envisaged as a way to mitigate the principle of 
complete elimination laid down under Article 1 of the proposed Agreement. 
Price and/or quantity triggers could be modulated based on speciﬁc guiding 
criteria such as the development stage of WTO Members or the size of 
exports subject to taxes (and thus the impact of such measures).
40
41
See Article 5.1 AoA. SSGs can be employed only with respect to those 
products that were tariffed under Article 4 AoA. 
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9chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
[TTIP] Agreement) (Espa and Holzer 2015). 
The solutions proposed have the potential to be implemented 
independently from each other (for example, action on 
transparency does not need to happen concurrently with a 
deal on predictability; the latter can be achieved regardless of 
whether WTO Members agree upon additional ﬂexibilities, and 
so on). At the same time, they are incremental in the sense that 
they could mutually reinforce and complement each other (for 
example, the expansion of import-speciﬁc GATT ﬂexibilities 
to export duty concessions would make WTO Members 
more prone to accept lower levels of export tariff bindings). 
In this respect, a reform addressing all three “dimensions” of 
transparency, predictability, and ﬂexibility would have better 
chances to reach higher levels of commitment in each of the 
dimensions than if it tackled any of them individually. 
For these reasons, a new agreement, either focused exclusively 
on export barriers or addressing the issue of export restrictions 
among other regulatory challenges related to extractives on a 
(more or less) broader sectoral basis, and including disciplines 
on export restrictions, remains the ﬁrst-best solution to raise 
the ambition of any reform of WTO disciplines on the export 
side. Under such an agreement, WTO Members could agree 
on a centralized regime for administering notiﬁcation and 
consultation requirements for export restrictions, clarify the 
applicability of the scheduling and binding procedure already 
envisaged for import tariffs under Article II:1(b) GATT to export 
duty concessions and commit to use it across-the-board 
to negotiate export tariff bindings in GATT schedules on a 
system-wide basis. They could also envisage ﬂexibilities that 
go beyond those already available to export restrictions under 
the GATT. An agreement of this kind could represent a workable 
compromise between net-importing WTO Members and 
resource-endowed developing country Members, and dissipate 
the inconsistencies emanating from the WTO accession regime 
on export duties as revealed in China – Raw Materials and China 
– Rare Earths. Finally, by creating the conditions for the launch 
of multilateral negotiations on export duty concessions, and 
limiting the availability of additional ﬂexibilities to export tariff 
bindings included in GATT schedules, it would provide WTO 
Members with the right incentives to privilege export taxes over 
more trade-restrictive QRs, in keeping with the spirit of the 
multilateral trading system.
Under Article 5.7 AoA, WTO Members implementing SSGs shall give notice 
“in writing, including relevant data” to the Committee on Agriculture “as far 
in advance as may be practicable and in any event within 10 days of the 
implementation of such action.”
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with any notiﬁcation requirements which might be agreed upon 
by WTO Members on the transparency side.43 
Inasmuch as such ﬂexibilities are either not envisaged in the 
GATT or import-speciﬁc only, they could be extended on the 
export side through amendment of the speciﬁc GATT provisions. 
They could also be incorporated into a new agreement, either 
devoted to regulating export taxes speciﬁcally or addressing, 
more or less comprehensively, the regulatory challenges 
emerging in the extractive sector, and including disciplines 
on export barriers. Accordingly, the requirements set forth in 
Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement would need to be fulﬁlled, 
namely acceptance by two-thirds of WTO Members for entry 
into force.44
Alternatively, a subset of WTO Members could in principle conclude a 
plurilateral agreement on export taxes to be added to Annex 4 of the WTO 
Agreement by consent of the Ministerial Conference expressed “exclusively 
by consensus.” Such an Agreement would bind only adhering Members, 
and third parties would remain excluded from any beneﬁts accruing from it 
according to Article X:9 of the Marrakesh Agreement.
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The proliferation of export barriers is one of the greatest 
challenges of the 21th century. Recent trends show that the 
issue is to remain critical for extractive industries, which face 
sector-speciﬁc challenges that make them particularly exposed 
to the “perverse” effects associated with export restrictions.45 
Yet, current WTO rules on export restrictions are overall 
fragmented and under-implemented. As a result, they are at 
times not coherent with the basic principle of the GATT system, 
according to which tariffs are the preferred and acceptable form 
of protection.46 Examples include those individual accession 
protocol provisions that impose export duty commitments on 
newly acceded WTO Members but do not have an ‘objective 
link’ to the GATT 1994.
Against this backdrop, this paper explored some avenues 
for improving multilateral disciplines on export restrictions 
in the direction of greater transparency, predictability, and 
ﬂexibility. Although acknowledging that attempts at reform 
may encounter much scepticism, if not open resistance, it was 
argued that a closer look at the inconsistencies created by the 
existing regime suggests that traditional opponents would 
actually be the ﬁrst to gain from more comprehensive and 
balanced disciplines re-establishing a level playing ﬁeld among 
all WTO Members. Further, a multilateral solution remains 
essential if one considers that the countries more actively 
engaging in the use of export restrictions, at least for what 
concerns the extractive sector (for example, China, the Russian 
Federation), have not yet concluded free trade agreements with 
those players, such as the EU, that systemically pursue a WTO-
plus strategy based on the complete removal of export duties 
in addition to QRs, matched with fewer exceptions than in the 
WTO, in their bilateral and regional trade agreements. Such 
a strategy has moreover proved difﬁcult to implement even in 
some cases where regional trade agreements are negotiated 
between such players themselves (for example, the case of US 
export restrictions on crude oil and natural gas in the energy 
CONCLUSIONS
See AB Report, China–Rare Earths, para. 5.156.
See Panel Report, Turkey–Textiles, para. 9.63. 
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